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(consonant) compared to conflicting (dissonant) infor-
mation if they have decided voluntarily and with a cer-
tain degree of commitment on a particular alternative
(e.g., Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2005; Jonas,
Graupmann, & Frey, 2006; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, &
Frey, 2005). This preference for supporting information
is often referred to as confirmation bias.1 Supporting
evidence for this confirmation bias comes from different
areas in social psychology, for example, research on
attitudes (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), social stereotypes
(Johnston, 1996), expectations in negotiations (Pinkley,
Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995), and self-serving conclu-
sions (Holton & Pyszczynski, 1989). Furthermore,
additional findings suggest that this confirmation bias is
not restricted to final decisions but also arises after pre-
liminary decisions (preference judgments; Jonas, Schulz-
Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001).
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When searching for information, groups that are homo-
geneous regarding their members’ prediscussion decision
preferences show a strong bias for information that sup-
ports rather than conflicts with the prevailing opinion (con-
firmation bias). The present research examined whether
homogeneous groups blindly search for information con-
firming their beliefs irrespective of the anticipated task or
whether they are sensitive to the usefulness of new infor-
mation for this forthcoming task. Results of three experi-
ments show that task sensitivity depends on the groups’
confidence in the correctness of their decision: Moderately
confident groups displayed a strong confirmation bias
when they anticipated having to give reasons for their
decision but showed a balanced information search or
even a disconfirmation bias (i.e., predominately seeking
conflicting information) when they anticipated having to
refute counterarguments. In contrast, highly confident
groups demonstrated a strong confirmation bias indepen-
dent of the anticipated task requirements.
Keywords: information seeking; selective exposure; confirmation
bias; group decision making; group confidence
Individuals as well as groups often have a biased approachto new information in nonroutine decision making
(Frey, 1986; Janis & Mann, 1977). Numerous studies
within the framework of cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957) have shown that people prefer supporting
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Recent studies provide evidence that such biased
information-seeking processes also occur in groups
(Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000;
Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002). In particular,
Schulz-Hardt et al. (2000, Experiment 3) have shown
that homogeneous groups (i.e., groups in which all
members had chosen the same decision alternative indi-
vidually) are more biased in their information search than
would have been predicted on the basis of each member’s
individual information requests (nominal group information
search). In contrast, the information requests of heteroge-
neous groups have been found to be less biased compared to
this baseline. These findings substantiate the notion that the
confirmation bias found in homogeneous groups actually
reflects group processes and cannot be explained by simply
combining individual confirmation biases.
Several authors have stressed the possible negative
consequences of biased information seeking in groups
that are responsible for making important decisions.
Janis (1982) and Nemeth and Rogers (1996), for
example, emphasize that in groups, biased information
seeking may result in potential warning signals’ being
overlooked and erroneous decisions with severe nega-
tive consequences being unwittingly made. This would
not pose a significant threat to group decision quality if
decision-making groups outside the laboratory con-
sisted primarily of members with heterogeneous deci-
sion preferences. However, decision-making groups in
practice are often homogeneous with respect to their
members’ preferences. Reasons for this include selection
effects and socialization processes that lead to group
members’ sharing similar opinions (e.g., in managerial
boards or political decision-making groups; cf. Schein,
1968). Therefore, the biased information search found in
homogeneous groups poses a significant threat to group
decision quality when the group task would benefit from
conflicting information’s being taken into account (Schulz-
Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).
However, group homogeneity would be less of a
problem if homogeneous groups were able to detect
when it is necessary to consider conflicting information
(and when it is not) and if they were capable of adapt-
ing their information search pattern if necessary.
Unfortunately, we do not know whether they have this
capability. In other words, it has not been determined
whether homogeneous groups “blindly” seek confirma-
tion of their beliefs irrespective of their tasks or whether
they are sensitive to the specific demands of their cur-
rent tasks. To answer this question, we focus on the
interplay between homogeneity of opinion in a group
and the requirements of the task the group has to per-
form. More specifically, we look at the information
search after decisions in homogeneous groups and
examine whether, and to what extent, different antici-
pated task requirements affect the groups’ preferences
for supporting and conflicting information.
Group Information Seeking and
Anticipated Task Requirements
On the basis of previous studies on confirmation bias
in group information search (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000;
Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002) it is not possible to specify
whether information search in homogeneous groups is
sensitive to situational requirements. In these studies,
groups worked on a decision task (e.g., to invest in
country A or country B). After a preliminary group
decision, the group was offered additional information
about the two decision alternatives. Each piece of infor-
mation (e.g., evaluations by experts) was characterized
by a main thesis indicating whether the corresponding
piece of information would support or contradict the
group’s preliminary decision; on the basis of these main
theses, each group selected the pieces of information that
should be read (by all group members). Homogeneous
groups (i.e., groups where all members preferred the
preliminary decision) exhibited a strong preference for
information supporting their decision (i.e., they showed
a confirmation bias). However, because they expected
that the subsequent group task would be to make a final
decision (and, perhaps, to discuss how this decision
should be implemented), two completely different
processes could have led to this confirmation bias: On
one hand, the homogeneous groups might have been
convinced that they had found the correct choice, ren-
dering conflicting information unnecessary, and they
might have tried to bolster this decision with supporting
information. Such (retrospectively oriented) bolstering
behavior would make them relatively insensitive to sit-
uational requirements that render conflicting informa-
tion useful. On the other hand, they might have been
concerned with how the final decision can be imple-
mented, and to promote this implementation they might
have focused on supporting information. Such behavior
would be future oriented and would imply that homo-
geneous groups are sensitive to task requirements.
To test whether homogeneous groups are sensitive to
situational requirements, we need to extend the experi-
mental paradigm described previously. As outlined in
the next section, such an extended paradigm exists in
research on individual information search (Canon,
1964; Freedman, 1965); it operates by letting the
participants anticipate different tasks following their
decision and their information search. In our present
experiments, we transferred this method to group
information search.
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Individual Information Seeking and
Anticipated Task Requirements
In their experiments on confirmatory information
search among individuals, carried out in the framework of
cognitive dissonance theory, Canon (1964) and Freedman
(1965) manipulated the type of task their participants
anticipated following the information search. Canon’s
participants had to make decisions on business prob-
lems and were told either that they would have to refute
counterarguments later in a debate or that they would
have to defend their position later in a written essay. After
the participants had made their decision, and before these
tasks were to be carried out, participants were given the
opportunity to select, by their titles, from among five arti-
cles that commented on the problem (two pro, two contra,
one neutral). The title of each article allowed participants
to identify which side of the problem the article advo-
cated. Canon predicted that participants anticipating a
debate would prefer conflicting information because
familiarizing oneself with the conflicting arguments
would help invalidate them later in the debate. In con-
trast, participants who anticipated having to write an
essay should prefer consonant articles because supporting
arguments help develop a justification for the decision.
Canon’s results confirmed his predictions: Participants
expecting to refute counterarguments in a debate were
more likely to choose conflicting information, whereas
participants expecting to write an essay explaining their
decisions were more likely to choose supporting informa-
tion. Freedman replicated these findings.
The Present Research
The previously mentioned studies have shown that
individuals are capable of adapting their biased infor-
mation search behavior to the requirements of a forth-
coming task. In the present research, we used this
anticipated task manipulation to find out whether
homogeneous groups—which have been shown to
exhibit a strong confirmation bias if the only task they
anticipate is having to make a final decision—adapt
their information search to the requirements of the
anticipated forthcoming group task. In Experiments 1a
and 1b, we compared the information search in groups
expecting to have to give reasons for their decision with
the information search in groups expecting to have to
refute counterarguments in two different samples. To
test the generalizability of our findings, we used a mili-
tary personnel sample in Experiment 1a and a college
students sample in Experiment 1b. Apart from that (and
the fact that a particularly relevant decision case was
chosen for each sample), the experiments are identical.
In Experiment 2, we tested a possible moderator for
differences observed in Experiments 1a and 1b, namely,
the groups’ confidence in their decision.
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B
Experiments 1a and 1b are based on the same exper-
imental design and were carried out simultaneously. We
report these experiments in parallel to allow a direct
comparison of the results.
Method
Participants and Design
Experiment 1a. One hundred fifty-two trainee
sergeants (all male, 19 to 24 years old) from the naval
college in Plön (a town in northern Germany) partici-
pated in this study. The participants formed 44 three-
person groups, which were homogeneous in terms of
their members’ individual decision preferences. The
investigation took place in the rooms of the naval col-
lege and was integrated into the lessons. The experiment
is based on a 2 (anticipated group task: justify the deci-
sion vs. refute counterarguments) × 2 (type of informa-
tion: supporting vs. conflicting) factorial design with
repeated measurement on the second factor.
Experiment 1b. One hundred twenty-three students
(63 females and 60 males, 16 to 18 years old) from the
high school and college levels of two gymnasiums in
Bad Schwartau (a town in northern Germany) partici-
pated in this study. Participants formed 41 three-person
groups, which were homogeneous in terms of their
members’ individual decision preferences. Only same-
sex groups were built.2 The investigation took place in
the rooms of the gymnasiums and was integrated into
the lessons. Experiment 1b is based on the same exper-
imental design as Experiment 1a.
Procedure
Experiment 1a. About 30 trainee sergeants partici-
pated in each experimental session. At the beginning of
the session, the experimenter introduced herself and her
assistants and informed the participants that the present
investigation was concerned with the question of whether a
professional army (replacing the current military service for
every young man) should be established in Germany. This
decision problem was chosen because it was known to
induce high involvement in the military staff. Participants
were informed that to find out what military staff think
about this question, a series of investigations were being
performed in different military units.
All participants then thought about the question
themselves and made a preliminary individual decision.
Kerschreiter et al. / BIASED INFORMATION SEARCH IN HOMOGENEOUS GROUPS 681
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Once the participants had reached a decision, they mem-
orized their personal numerical code that they were
asked to use for all further questionnaires to guarantee
anonymity. Participants were assigned to homogeneous
three-person groups on the basis of the decision taken,
and the groups were distributed as evenly as possible
among the two experimental conditions. The remaining
participants were assigned to a different experiment.
Each group was seated at a separate table. The groups
were informed that after a discussion lasting approxi-
mately 10 min, they should come to a preliminary
group decision. The groups wrote their preliminary
decision on a prepared form and indicated on a scale
from 0 to 10 how certain they were about the correct-
ness of their decision.
Before the subsequent information search, the antici-
pated group task was manipulated similar to the way
Canon (1964) and Freedman (1965) introduced this fac-
tor for individuals: Groups in the justify decision condi-
tion were told that afterward they would have to give
reasons for their decision in a short essay, whereas groups
in the refute counterarguments condition expected to par-
ticipate in a written debate during which they would have
to refute arguments against their decision. In line with
Canon and with Freedman, we reasoned that supporting
information should be more useful if the groups had to
justify their decision, and conflicting information should
be more useful if they had to refute counterarguments
because the conflicting information would give them
advance knowledge of these counterarguments.
After the experimenter and her assistants had made
sure that all group members had fully understood their
group’s task, the groups were informed that to prepare
for their task (justify the decision vs. refute counterar-
guments), additional information about the decision
problem was available. This additional information
consisted of 10 statements written by experts on mili-
tary politics. Each statement was said to be about one
page in length and was summarized by a main thesis
(one sentence). From this main thesis it was obvious
whether the corresponding article argued in favor of or
against a professional army. All the main theses were
written on a sheet of paper handed out to the partici-
pants. Five of the corresponding articles favored, and
the other five opposed, a professional army. Groups
were asked to mark the main theses of the articles they
wanted to read later; they could request as many articles
as they wanted. Before filling in the request form,
groups learned that each selected article would be
handed out to, and should be read by, each group
member to make sure that all members had exactly the
same information at their disposal when the forthcom-
ing group task started. In fact, this instruction was given
to ensure that the group members had to negotiate
about the information requests and thereby guarantee
that the group information search was a group product.
After the request forms for the group information
search had been collected, the experiment was over.
Participants were informed in detail about the aims of
the investigation, especially why no reading of the arti-
cles and no writing of the essay or no debate were nec-
essary. Finally, they were thanked for their participation
and dismissed.
Experiment 1b. The course of Experiment 1b was
similar to that of Experiment 1a except, as noted previ-
ously, the groups consisted of high school and college
students facing a different decision problem (adapted to
suit the student sample). The decision problem dealt
with the question of whether the time students spend in
college in Germany should be reduced by 1 year (and
thereby brought in line with the majority of other
European countries). Both alternatives (reduction of the
time spent in college by 1 year vs. no reduction) were
again supported by an identical number of arguments
that had been constructed to be equally strong.
Results and Discussion
Check for Possible Interfering Effects
In both experiments, no significant differences in the
search for supporting and conflicting articles were
found between supporters and opponents of a profes-
sional army or a reduction of college time, respectively.
Similarly, participants’ age (or sex in Experiment 1b)
had no influence on information search.
Information Search
Experiment 1a. Table 1 shows the cell means of the
information search. The conditions did not differ with
respect to the overall number of articles requested, F(1,
42) < 1. Instead, a significant main effect for type of
information emerged, F(1, 42) = 49.31, p < .001, ηp² =
.54, indicating a clear preference for supporting (M =
2.34, SD = 0.96) compared to conflicting (M = 0.86,
SD = 1.03) articles. Separate t tests against zero revealed
a significant confirmation bias (i.e., the difference value
between the number of chosen supporting and conflict-
ing articles) for justify decision groups (M = 1.29, SD =
1.33) and refute counterarguments groups (M = 1.70,
SD = 1.49), t(23) = 4.74, p < .001, and t(19) = 5.10,
p < .001, respectively. However, no differences in the
information search between justify decision groups
and refute counterarguments groups could be observed
(F < 1). This pattern of results did not change when the
supporting and conflicting articles requested were
analyzed separately (F = 1 and F < 1, respectively).
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Experiment 1b. Table 2 shows the cell means of the
information search. As in Experiment 1a, the conditions
did not differ with respect to the overall number of arti-
cles requested, F(1, 39) < 1. Instead, results revealed a
main effect for type of information, F(1, 39) = 4.12, p =
.050, ηp² = .10, indicating a preference for supporting
(M = 2.20, SD = 1.33) compared to conflicting (M =
1.54, SD = 1.21) articles. In contrast to Experiment 1a,
the interaction between information type and antici-
pated group task became significant, F(1, 39) = 7.09,
p = .011, ηp² = .15, because the confirmation bias in jus-
tify decision groups (M = 1.48, SD = 2.04) was much
stronger than in refute counterarguments groups (M =
–0.20, SD = 1.99), which even show a small disconfir-
mation bias. Separate t tests show that the confirmation
bias of justify decision groups differs significantly from
zero, t(20) = 3.32, p = .003, whereas the (dis-)confir-
mation bias of refute counterarguments groups does not
reach significance, t(19) = –0.45, p = .658.
So far, the results of Experiments 1a and 1b have
replicated previous findings showing that homogeneous
groups predominantly seek information supporting the
group’s preliminary or final decision (Schulz-Hardt
et al., 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002). However, the
results of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b seem to
contradict each other with regard to our main research
question, namely, whether the information search in
homogeneous groups is sensitive to the usefulness of the
information for the anticipated group task. Whereas in
Experiment 1a the groups’ preference for supporting
compared to conflicting information was independent
of the anticipated group task, a significant interaction
between type of information and anticipated group task
became evident in Experiment 1b.
Confidence in the Decision
The differences in the information search observed in
Experiments 1a and 1b call for a closer look at differ-
ences between the two experiments that might account
for the contradictory results. First, different samples
and, consequently, different decision tasks were used in
Experiments 1a and 1b. Obviously, it is possible that
this might have influenced the results. However, a closer
inspection of the results reveals another explanation for
the differential results of Experiments 1a and 1b.
According to the heuristic-systematic model of persua-
sion (HSM; cf. Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; see
also Chaiken & Trope, 1999), a decision maker’s motiva-
tion to engage in more systematic, effortful ways of
information processing is contingent on the perceived suf-
ficiency of the information already available. According to
this sufficiency principle of the HSM, the discrepancy
between actual and desired levels of confidence is the
fundamental motivator of processing effort. The suffi-
ciency principle asserts that people will exert cognitive
effort only if they have not yet attained a sufficient
degree of confidence about being able to pursue their
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TABLE 1: Information Search Dependent on Group Task in Experiment 1a
Information
Supportinga Conflictinga Confirmation Biasb
Group Task M SD M SD M SD
Justify decision (n = 24) 2.21 1.02 0.92 1.18 1.29 1.33
Refute counterarguments (n = 20) 2.50 0.89 0.80 0.83 1.70 1.49
a. Supporting articles are articles that confirm the correctness of the preliminary group decision, whereas conflicting articles dispute the correct-
ness of this decision.
b. The confirmation bias corresponds to the difference between the number of chosen supporting articles and the number of chosen conflicting
articles.
TABLE 2: Information Search Dependent on Group Task in Experiment 1b
Information
Supportinga Conflictinga Confirmation Biasb
Group Task M SD M SD M SD
Justify decision (n = 21) 2.62 1.50 1.14 1.06 1.48 2.04
Refute counterarguments (n = 20) 1.75 0.97 1.95 1.23 –0.20 1.99
a. Supporting articles are articles that confirm the correctness of the preliminary group decision, whereas conflicting articles dispute the correct-
ness of this decision.
b. The confirmation bias corresponds to the difference between the number of chosen supporting articles and the number of chosen conflicting
articles.
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goals. If individuals or groups perceive their current
state of knowledge as insufficient—that is, the actual
confidence is lower than the sufficiency threshold on the
confidence continuum—they are proposed to exert cog-
nitive effort to close the gap between actual and desired
levels of confidence. In contrast, if the actual confidence
equals or exceeds the desired confidence, individuals or
groups will be unlikely to engage in effortful processing
of information. Adapting group information search to
the requirements of a forthcoming task requires effort
because groups have to consider which pieces of information
are useful for these purposes. In contrast, simply following
the dominant strategy of homogeneous groups, namely, to
search for supporting information, requires less effort, par-
ticularly given that processing supporting information is less
effortful than processing conflicting information (e.g.,
Edwards & Smith, 1996). Thus, it can be predicted that
homogeneous groups that are highly confident about
already having made the correct decision will hardly adapt
their information search to situational requirements,
whereas less confident homogeneous groups will do so.
In summary, it is conceivable that future task require-
ments do not influence information search when groups
are very confident. When we take into account that the
decision problem used in Experiment 1a was chosen to
present a case that was relevant for the participating sol-
diers, it is possible that many of the soldiers already had
a very clear opinion on the topic, reflected in very high
decision confidence. To investigate this idea, we decided
to analyze the information search of highly confident and
moderately confident groups separately.
Experiment 1a. At first, we compared justify decision
groups and refute counterarguments groups with
respect to confidence. No significant differences were
found, F(1, 42) = 1.51, p = .227, ηp² = .04. Interestingly,
however, 50% of the groups in Experiment 1a reported
the highest confidence rating possible (i.e., 10). Thus, as
suspected, a fairly high percentage of groups did not
have any doubts about the correctness of their decision.
Obviously, with a median of 9.50 on a confidence scale
from 0 to 10 in Experiment 1a, the groups below the
median cannot be considered to have experienced only
moderate confidence in their decision. Therefore, we
did not split the groups in Experiment 1a at the median
but used a more reasonable confidence criterion to dis-
tinguish highly confident (i.e., confidence ratings of 9 or
10) from moderately confident (i.e., confidence ratings
of 8 and below) groups. A significant interaction
between this confidence factor and anticipated group
task, F(1, 40) = 4.66, p = .037, ηp² = .10, indicated
that information search in moderately confident groups
followed the task sensitivity pattern: Whereas the
moderately confident justify decision groups exhibited a
strong and significant confirmation bias (M = 1.64,
SD = 1.21), t(10) = 4.50, p = .001, for a t test against
zero, this confirmation bias was lower in the moderately
confident refute counterarguments groups (M = 0.83,
SD = 2.32), t(15) = 0.95, p = .356, for the contrast
between both conditions and did not differ significantly
from zero in this condition, t(5) = 0.88, p = .419. In con-
trast, among the highly confident groups, both the jus-
tify decision groups (M = 1.00, SD = 1.41), t(12) = 2.55,
p = .025, and the refute counterarguments groups (M =
2.07, SD = 0.83), t(13) = 9.35, p < .001, exhibited a sig-
nificant confirmation bias, with the bias in the latter
condition being significantly stronger than the bias in the
former condition, t(25) = –2.42, p = .023.3 Hence, infor-
mation search in highly confident homogeneous groups
clearly did not follow the pattern of task sensitivity.
Experiment 1b. Again, no significant differences between
justify decision groups and refute counterarguments
groups were found with respect to confidence, F(1, 39) <
1. In Experiment 1b, however, only 20% of the groups
reported the maximum confidence rating possible (i.e.,
10) compared to 50% of the groups in Experiment 1a.
To learn more about possible moderator effects of high
group confidence, we divided the groups in Experiment
1b into highly confident (i.e., confidence ratings of 9 or
10) and moderately confident (i.e., confidence ratings of
8 and below) groups. When entering the confidence
median split as an additional factor in the analysis, the
results again show a (marginal) interaction between the
confidence factor and the anticipated group task, F(1, 37)
= 3.35, p = .075, ηp² = .08.
To break down this interaction, effects of task antic-
ipation on the confirmation bias were analyzed sepa-
rately for moderately confident and for highly confident
groups. As in Experiment 1a, the highly confident
groups showed a similar confirmation bias in both task
anticipation conditions for justify decision groups (M =
1.33, SD = 1.80), t(8) = 2.22, p = .057, and refute coun-
terarguments groups (M = 1.00, SD = 1.69), t(7) = 1.67,
p = .138. Both conditions did not significantly differ
from each other, t(37) = 0.35, p = .725. In contrast, and
again as in Experiment 1a, within the subgroup of the
moderately confident groups only the justify decision
groups exhibited a significant confirmation bias (M =
1.58, SD = 2.27), t(11) = 2.41, p = .035, whereas this
time the refute counterarguments groups even exhibited
a disconfirmation bias (M = –1.00, SD = 1.81), t(11) =
–1.92, p = .082. The difference between both conditions
was significant, t(37) = 3.27, p = .002. Thus, these
results structurally replicate the findings of the similar
analysis in Experiment 1a. 
In summary, although at first glance Experiments 1a
and 1b seem to have yielded contradictory results with
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regard to the effects of task anticipation on the confir-
mation bias, these results reveal striking parallels if
group decision confidence is taken into account as a
moderator: Highly confident groups exhibited a confir-
mation bias, irrespective of whether they anticipate hav-
ing to justify their decision or having to refute
counterarguments. In contrast, moderately confident
groups exhibited a confirmation bias only if they antic-
ipated they would have to justify their decision; no such
bias was found if they anticipated they would have to
refute counterarguments. Because the proportion of
moderately confident groups was higher in Experiment 1b
than in Experiment 1a, the latter (task-sensitive) pattern
dominated in Experiment 1b when confidence was not
taken into account, whereas the former (task-insensitive)
pattern dominated in Experiment 1a. When we consider
the overall high level of confidence, and the relatively
small differences in confidence between moderately and
highly confident groups, the post hoc test of our hypoth-
esis seems conservative. Accordingly, it is even more
impressive that the results show the expected difference
between moderately and highly confident groups.
However, this interpretation of an interaction between
group confidence and anticipated group task on group
information search in homogeneous groups should be
treated with caution because the confidence factor was
generated ex post, based on our measurements of group
confidence. A direct test of this interactive effect requires
an experimental manipulation of group confidence (in
addition, and orthogonal, to the anticipated group task
manipulation). This was done in Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to provide a more rig-
orous test of the idea that task sensitivity of homoge-
neous groups’ information search depends on the
groups’ confidence in the correctness of their decision.
Specifically, we predicted that anticipated task require-
ments influence confirmatory information search in homo-
geneous groups only when the groups’ confidence does not
exceed moderate levels. Consequently, Experiment 2 dif-
fered from Experiments 1a and 1b in that confidence in
the decision was introduced as an additional experi-
mental factor. To experimentally manipulate the
groups’ confidence in the decision, we adapted a tech-
nique used in studies on the explanation effect. These
studies provide convincing evidence that the generation
of arguments supporting a particular position increases
the participants’ confidence that this position is valid
(for an overview, see Koehler, 1991). Therefore, we
decided to manipulate confidence by instructing par-
ticipants either to consider why they were especially
qualified to make an appropriate decision (high-confidence
condition) or to consider why it would be difficult
for them to make an appropriate decision (moderate-
confidence condition). Pretests had shown that this kind
of confidence manipulation is more successful than
simply telling the participants that they were qualified




Ninety-nine students (51 females, 48 males) from the
college level (between 18 and 21 years old, M = 18.63,
SD = 0.86) of three colleges in Munich, Germany, par-
ticipated in this study. The students formed 33 three-
person groups, which were homogenous with regard to
their members’ individual decision preferences. One
group was excluded from the analysis because of incom-
plete data. The investigation took place in the rooms of
the colleges and was integrated into the lessons. The
experiment is based on a 2 (group confidence: high vs.
moderate) × 2 (anticipated group task: justify the deci-
sion vs. refute counterarguments) × 2 (type of informa-
tion: supporting vs. conflicting) factorial design with
repeated measurement on the third factor.
Procedure
About 24 students participated in each experimental
session. At the start of each experimental session, par-
ticipants were divided into two large groups, both of
approximately the same size, and led to two adjacent
rooms. The same decision problem as in Experiment 1b
was used. The experimenters, one for each room, intro-
duced themselves and their assistants and informed the
participants that the investigation deals with the ques-
tion of whether the time students spend in college in
Germany should be reduced by 1 year.
Before the participants were asked to decide individ-
ually whether the number of school years should be
reduced, their confidence in their capability of reaching
an optimal decision was manipulated (cf. Koehler,
1991). To induce high confidence, participants in one
room were asked to consider why they were especially
qualified to make an appropriate decision on this matter
and to write down the most important reason on a
form. To induce moderate confidence, participants in
the other room were asked to consider why it would be
rather difficult for them to make an appropriate deci-
sion on this matter and to write down the most impor-
tant reason on a form.
All participants were then invited to think about the
question themselves and to make a preliminary individual
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decision. When all participants had come to an individual
decision, they were assigned to homogeneous groups of
three on the basis of the decision taken. The remaining
participants were assigned to a different experiment.
After the group assignment, the groups were distrib-
uted as evenly as possible among the two levels of the
group task factor and were led to four separate rooms,
one for each experimental condition. Each group was
seated at a separate table. Immediately before the group
discussion started, the manipulation of confidence in
the capability of reaching an optimal decision was
repeated. This time, participants in the high-confidence
condition were asked to state arguments why they thought
they would be especially qualified to make an appropriate
decision, whereas participants in the moderate-confidence
condition were asked to state arguments why they
thought it would be rather difficult for them to make
an appropriate decision. In both confidence conditions,
the experimenter repeated and summarized the main
arguments. This modified brainstorming technique was
limited to approximately 5 min. It sustained the confi-
dence manipulation of the first part of the experimental
session and ensured that the manipulation affected con-
fidence at the group level.
Next, as in Experiments 1a and 1b, the groups were
informed that after a discussion lasting approximately 10
min they should come to a preliminary group decision. The
groups wrote their preliminary decision on a prepared form
and indicated on a scale from 0 to 10 how certain they were
about the correctness of their decision. After that, the exper-
iment continued with the information search.
The anticipated group task was manipulated in the
same way as in Experiments 1a and 1b. That is, whereas
half of the groups expected that they would subse-
quently have to justify their decision, the other half of
the groups expected to have to refute counterarguments
in a written debate. Again, the experimenters made sure
that all group members had fully understood their
group’s task before the information search began. The
procedure of the information search was identical to
that in Experiments 1a and 1b.
After the request forms for the information search
had been collected, the experiment was over.
Participants were informed in detail about the aims of
our investigation (especially why no reading of the arti-
cles and no writing of the essay were necessary). They
were thanked for their participation and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Check for Possible Interfering Effects and
Manipulation Check
Neither participants’ age nor the chosen alternative
(reduction of the time in college by 1 year vs. no reduc-
tion) had any significant influence on information
search. To check the experimental manipulation, the
confidence the groups experienced in their decisions
was compared between high- and moderate-confidence
conditions. As expected, the confidence ratings of the
groups in the high-confidence condition (M = 8.69, SD =
1.40) were significantly higher than the confidence ratings
of groups in the moderate-confidence condition (M =
7.38, SD = 1.45), F(1, 30) = 6.76, p = .014, ηp² = .18. We
therefore conclude that our manipulation was successful.
Information Search
In Table 3 the cell means of the information search
are shown. The four experimental conditions do not dif-
fer with respect to the overall number of articles
requested, F(3, 28) < 1. In a 2 (group confidence: high
vs. moderate) × 2 (anticipated group task: justify the
decision vs. refute counterarguments) × 2 (type of infor-
mation: supporting vs. conflicting) ANOVA with
repeated measurement on the third factor, interactions
between both experimental factors and the type of
information factor became significant, showing that
group task, F(1, 28) = 5.41, p = .028, ηp² = .16, and
group confidence, F(1, 28) = 5.41, p = .028, ηp² = .16,
moderate the confirmation bias. However, as predicted,
both interactions were qualified by a significant three-
way interaction, F(1, 28) = 4.38, p = .046, ηp² = .14,
showing that the confirmation bias was moderated by
group task and group confidence interactively.
To decompose this three-way interaction, effects of
task anticipation on the confirmation bias were analyzed
separately for the moderate-confidence conditions and the
high-confidence conditions using planned contrasts. In the
moderate-confidence condition, the two group task con-
ditions significantly differed with respect to the confirma-
tion bias, t(28) = 3.12, p = .004. Whereas the justify
decision groups showed a significant confirmation bias
(M = 2.13, SD = 1.36), the refute counterarguments
groups searched for information in a balanced way (M =
–0.25, SD = 1.75). Separate t tests show that the confir-
mation bias in the justify decision groups differs signifi-
cantly from zero, t(7) = 4.43, p = .003, whereas the
confirmation bias in the refute counterarguments groups
does not reach significance, t(7) = –0.40, p = .699.
In contrast, in the high-confidence condition, no dif-
ferences between the two group task conditions were
observed regarding the confirmation bias, t(28) = 0.16,
p = .871. Both the justify decision groups (M = 2.25,
SD = 1.58) and the refute counterarguments groups
(M = 2.13, SD = 1.36) showed a substantial confirma-
tion bias. Separate t tests demonstrate that the confir-
mation bias differed significantly from zero in the justify
decision groups, t(7) = 4.03, p = .005, and the refute
counterarguments groups, t(7) = 4.43, p = .003.
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to provide a
clear-cut test of the idea that the effect of different task
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requirements on biased information search in homoge-
neous groups depends on the groups’ confidence in the
correctness of their decision. This attempt was successful.
Groups in the moderate-confidence condition showed a
strong confirmation bias when they expected they
would have to justify their decisions, whereas no such
bias occurred when the groups expected they would
have to refute counterarguments. In contrast, groups in
the high-confidence condition showed a substantial
confirmation bias independent of the task they expected
to complete. In summary, Experiment 2 demonstrates
that the contradictory results of Experiments 1a and 1b
can in fact be attributed to the different levels of confi-
dence the groups experienced in their decisions (i.e.,
very high confidence in Experiment 1a and only moder-
ate confidence in Experiment 1b) and that taking group
confidence into account is necessary to make meaning-
ful predictions with regard to homogeneous groups’
task sensitivity in information search.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When searching for information, homogeneous
groups show a strong bias for information that supports,
rather than conflicts with, the prevailing opinion in the
group (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al.,
2002). The present research was designed to explore
whether homogeneous groups blindly seek confirmation
of their beliefs irrespective of the anticipated forthcoming
task or whether they are sensitive to the usefulness of the
information for the groups’ forthcoming task. At first
glance, the results of Experiments 1a and 1b seemed to
contradict each other: Whereas in Experiment 1a the
groups’ anticipated task had no influence on information-
seeking behavior (i.e., the groups showed a pronounced
confirmation bias irrespective of their anticipated task),
in Experiment 1b the groups faced with justifying the
decision showed a strong confirmation bias and the
groups faced with refuting counterarguments showed no
confirmation bias, thus indicating task sensitivity. A
closer look at the differences between the two experi-
ments revealed that a large proportion of groups in
Experiment 1a gave extraordinarily high ratings about
their confidence in the correctness of their decision,
which might have reduced these groups’ task sensitivity
in information search. As expected, the task-sensitive
information search pattern found in Experiment 1b (i.e.,
a strong confirmation bias in the justify decision condi-
tion and a lower confirmation bias in the refute counter-
arguments condition) also emerged in Experiment 1a
when we differentiated between highly confident and
moderately confident groups. Furthermore, differentiat-
ing highly confident and moderately confident groups in
Experiment 1b revealed that analogous to Experiment
1a, the task-sensitive information search pattern was only
present in the moderately confident groups but not in the
highly confident groups.
In Experiment 2, we directly manipulated the
hypothesized moderator variable group confidence and
demonstrated that differences observed in Experiments
1a and 1b can indeed be attributed to the different lev-
els of confidence the groups experienced in the correct-
ness of their decisions. Only groups in the moderate-
confidence condition showed a differential information
search pattern dependent on the task they expected to
perform; in contrast, groups in the high-confidence con-
dition exhibited a strong confirmation bias irrespective
of their anticipated task. In sum, we can conclude that
the answer to the question of whether homogeneous
groups are sensitive to task requirements when search-
ing for new information depends on the confidence the
groups experience in their decisions.
As we outlined previously, an explanation as to why
groups are only sensitive to task requirements when
group confidence does not exceed moderate levels can be
derived from the HSM (cf. Chaiken et al. 1989; see also
Chaiken & Trope, 1999). According to the sufficiency
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TABLE 3: Information Search Dependent on Group Confidence in the Decision and Group Task in Experiment 2
Information
Supportinga Conflictinga Confirmation Biasb
Group Task M SD M SD M SD
Moderate-confidence groups
Justify decision (n = 8) 3.25 1.04 1.13 0.83 2.13 1.36
Refute counterarguments (n = 8) 1.88 0.99 2.13 1.73 –0.25 1.75
High-confidence groups
Justify decision (n = 8) 3.00 1.41 0.75 0.71 2.25 1.58
Refute counterarguments (n = 8) 3.00 1.07 0.88 0.83 2.13 1.36
a. Supporting articles are articles that confirm the correctness of the preliminary group decision, whereas conflicting articles dispute the correct-
ness of this decision.
b. The confirmation bias corresponds to the difference between the number of chosen supporting articles and the number of chosen conflicting
articles.
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principle of the HSM, groups should be motivated to
exert processing effort only if they have not yet attained
their desired level of confidence. To successfully adapt
their information search to the requirements of a forth-
coming task, groups have to consider which pieces of
information are useful for this task. Obviously, this
requires more effort than simply searching for supporting
information, irrespective of the forthcoming task, partic-
ularly given that processing supporting information is
less effortful than processing conflicting information
(e.g., Edwards & Smith, 1996). However, the hypothesis
that homogeneous groups try to reach a certain level of
desired confidence has yet to be tested. Therefore, future
research should try to measure the desired confidence of the
groups to find out if it is the discrepancy between actual and
desired levels of confidence that motivates the less confident
homogeneous groups to exert the extra effort necessary to
adapt their information search to task requirements.
Theoretical Implications
Two major theoretical implications can be derived
from our findings. First, our findings extend previous
research on group homogeneity and group information
search (especially Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000) by investi-
gating the influence of anticipated task requirements on
the search for new information in homogeneous groups.
So far, research has neglected the fact that future task
requirements are highly relevant for a functional expo-
sure to new information in real life. Taking this reason-
ing one step further, one might ask how heterogeneous
groups would react to future task requirements. As
demonstrated by Schulz-Hardt and colleagues (e.g.,
Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000), groups with heterogeneous
decision preferences hardly show any confirmation bias
when the only task they expect to perform is making a
final decision. Furthermore, heterogeneous groups in
general experience lower confidence than homogeneous
groups in the correctness of the decision. Therefore,
based on our results with moderately confident homo-
geneous groups it seems conceivable that heterogeneous
groups should also be sensitive to future task require-
ments, as anticipation of having to justify their position
induces a confirmation bias, whereas “usually” they do
not exhibit such a bias. Consequently, heterogeneous
groups should be particularly beneficial for group
performance when group performance benefits from
adapting the group information search to the varying
task requirements. Testing this hypothesis represents an
interesting topic for future research.
Second, our results help clarify the influence of con-
fidence on information search. Whereas our experi-
ments with homogeneous groups suggest that sensitivity
for task requirements depends on group confidence, no
such interaction between anticipated task requirements
and confidence was observed in the earlier studies with
individuals (Canon, 1964; Freedman, 1965).4 One
explanation for this discrepancy could be that the con-
fidence levels reached in (homogeneous) groups are not
reached by individuals and that the pattern of results
changes only when the confidence in the decision
reaches the extraordinarily high confidence levels found
in (homogeneous) groups. In line with this reasoning,
Sniezek (1992), reviewing the literature on confidence
in group decision making, arrived at the conclusion that
groups are more confident than individuals and that the
confidence of the group members increases with group
discussion. In addition, our groups were homogeneous
with regard to the members’ prediscussion decision
preferences. Clearly, learning that all group members
share the same decision preference enhances group con-
fidence in the correctness of this decision (cf. Mojzisch,
Schulz-Hardt, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2007). Taken
together, this might boost confidence to levels where
task sensitivity is no longer given.
However, from the perspective of the HSM (Chaiken
et al., 1989), these high confidence levels that are
reached in a large proportion of the homogeneous
groups lead to an interesting problem: Because highly
confident groups should have already reached (or even
exceeded) their desired level of confidence, the suffi-
ciency principle would imply that these groups hardly
search for information at all or, at least, search for less
information than that sought by moderately confident
groups. Therefore, it is surprising that we found no dif-
ferences between highly confident and moderately con-
fident groups in the overall amount of information they
sought but only in the quality of the information they
sought (i.e., the confirmation bias). One reason for this
finding might be that decision makers hold a general
belief about the minimal amount of information that
one should consider before making a decision and that
highly confident as well as moderately confident groups
in our experiments had not yet considered this minimal
amount of information. In this case, differences between
highly confident and moderately confident groups
should affect the type of information groups search for
but not the quantity of information, which is exactly
what we observed in our experiments. Support for this
idea also comes from a recent study by Scholten, van
Knippenberg, Nijstad, and De Dreu (2007), showing
that group members who experienced lower informa-
tion sufficiency repeated unshared information more
often and were more likely to solve a hidden profile.
Notably, in the case of a hidden profile most (or all)
shared pieces of information are preference consistent,
whereas unshared information is predominantly prefer-
ence inconsistent. Therefore, it is conceivable that the
tendency of groups who experienced lower information
sufficiency to focus on unshared information is at least
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partially due to the fact that these groups showed a less
pronounced confirmation bias in the group discussion.
Similar to the high- and low-confidence groups in our
experiments, groups high and low in information suffi-
ciency in the Scholten et al. study did not differ in the
overall proportion of available shared and unshared
information exchanged. In summary, future research
needs to substantiate which factors motivate the search
for new information and the exchange of unshared
information when group confidence is high (cf. De
Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008).
It is interesting to note that the experimental condi-
tion in which groups anticipated having to justify their
decision is closely related to what has previously been
termed outcome accountability (i.e., having to account
for the decision or judgment outcomes; cf. Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999). In contrast to process accountability
(which refers to having to account for the way in which
decisions or judgments are reached), outcome account-
ability has been shown to enhance the motivation to
leave a positive impression on others and, hence, to
result in a pronounced confirmation bias (e.g., Jonas
et al., 2005; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998). Therefore,
incentives to reach a correct decision created by
accountability do not automatically motivate group
members to be as accurate as possible when making a
decision. Rather, the effects closely depend on the type of
accountability involved (process vs. outcome; cf. Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999). Similarly, groups do not automatically adapt
their information search to future task requirements. Rather,
the level of confidence in the correctness of the (preliminary)
decision moderates the effects of future tasks requirements.
Practical Implications
In this research, we tried to clarify whether the infor-
mation search behavior of homogeneous groups poses a
problem. We proposed that homogeneous groups have
to be considered problematic if these groups show a
strong confirmation bias in the information search and
do not adapt this confirmation bias to task require-
ments. By showing that highly confident homogeneous
groups were not sensitive to task requirements whereas
moderately confident homogeneous groups were, our
results suggest that highly confident homogeneous
groups are a problem, whereas moderately confident
homogeneous groups are not. However, when consider-
ing the implications of our findings, some further points
should be taken into account.
On one hand, whether highly confident homoge-
neous groups have to be considered problematic
depends on whether the confidence experienced by
these groups accurately reflects their decision quality, in
other words, whether they are overconfident. If, for
example, in our experimental setting high confidence
was accompanied by high accuracy (which was not
measurable with our decision task), this high accuracy
should enable the groups to refute counterarguments
even without having considered conflicting information
beforehand because in this situation any counterargu-
ments have to be largely invalid by definition. If, how-
ever, highly confident groups were not necessarily very
accurate, a substantial proportion of these groups might
be confronted with serious counterarguments that they
had not anticipated. As a consequence, future research
needs to investigate whether the higher decision confidence
of highly confident homogeneous groups is accompanied
by higher decision quality (in which case homogeneous
groups would be less of a problem) or whether decision
confidence and decision quality are largely independent of
each other (in which case homogeneous groups would
pose a serious problem). Based on previous research on
confidence and decision quality (e.g., Heath & Gonzalez,
1995; Sniezek & Henry, 1989), we assume that the latter
is more likely to be the case. 
If our assumption turns out to be correct, an impor-
tant issue to consider in future research is how to
prevent overconfidence (especially in homogeneous
groups). To give just two examples for possible inter-
ventions, group members could be required to provide
reasons why their group decision could be wrong (cf.
Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980) or a counter-
factual mind-set could be activated in the group
members (cf. Kray & Galinsky, 2003). It is interesting
to note that many of the factors that are known to
improve group decision quality (e.g., heterogeneity of
opinion; see Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006) should make the
decision makers more uncertain about those decisions
(cf. Sniezek & Buckley, 1993). 
However, as long as being confident does not imply
overconfidence, being confident clearly provides benefits
as well. Most importantly, being confident means that one
is ready for action whereas lack of confidence may lead to
inaction. In particular, feeling confident about having
made the right decision may foster the development of an
action-oriented mind-set (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984;
Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989) aimed at shielding a behav-
ioral intention during the process of enactment. Indeed,
homogeneous groups have been shown to be more effec-
tive in implementing a decision than heterogeneous
groups (White, Dittrich, & Lang, 1980). Consequently,
confidence in group decisions is not something we want to
destroy. Therefore, interventions are needed that make
group members attend to future task requirements (i.e.,
reduce overconfidence) while simultaneously preserving
the advantage of action readiness (i.e., preserve confi-
dence). Developing such interventions appears to be a very
promising avenue for future research.
On the other hand, it is also debatable whether mod-
erately confident homogeneous groups are always task
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sensitive in practice. In our experiments, it was rela-
tively easy to detect whether adapting the confirmation
bias to task requirements is beneficial for task perfor-
mance. In practice, this often might be less clear. For
example, task performance for groups in practice often
means decision quality: Groups perform well if they
make high-quality decisions. Thus, groups are task sen-
sitive if they abstain from showing a confirmation bias
whenever this bias would be detrimental for decision
quality. Now, the consequences of biased information
search for group decision quality crucially depend on
how the information is distributed among the group
members before discussion. When the available infor-
mation is distributed in an unbiased manner, most or all
group members should already have a preference for the
best decision alternative before the group discussion
(“manifest profile”; Lavery, Franz, Winquist, &
Larson, 1999). In this situation, a confirmation bias
during the group discussion would have no negative
consequences; it should even be beneficial because it
speeds up making the correct decision. However, when
the available information is distributed in a biased
manner, and therefore the group members’ individual
information suggests a suboptimal decision alternative
(i.e., when a “hidden profile“ exists; cf. Brodbeck,
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007), a con-
firmation bias should prevent the group from both tap-
ping its full potential and identifying the best possible
decision alternative during group discussion. Indeed,
recent studies support the idea that a confirmation bias
is detrimental to decision quality when a hidden profile
exists (e.g., Kray & Galinsky, 2003; Schulz-Hardt et al.,
2006). Unfortunately, it is very difficult for group
members to detect whether the information is distrib-
uted in a hidden-profile manner because doing so
requires them to be very attentive to who holds what
information. Thus, more subtle tests of homogeneous
groups’ task sensitivity are needed in the future.
As pointed out by Sniezek and Buckley (1993), the
ultimate contribution of research on (group) confidence
for decision-making theory and practice depends on
demonstrating the consequences of (group) confidence
for decision-relevant behavior. The studies reported
here provide another step in linking confidence to
behavior in groups by showing how high confidence
can diminish task sensitivity in information search.
NOTES
1. The term confirmation bias here has a slightly different mean-
ing from the context of hypothesis testing where it is also often used
(e.g., Snyder & White, 1981). In the latter, confirmatory hypothesis
testing or confirmation bias, respectively, means looking for evidence
that would confirm a preselected hypothesis—without knowing
whether one will find this evidence. In the research on decision
making we are referring to, confirmation bias means requesting infor-
mation that will support a preselected alternative; thus, the decision
maker using this strategy knows that he or she will get the confirma-
tion sought.
2. The reason for choosing single-sex groups was that all groups
in Experiment 1a (military staff) had been single-sex groups because
all participants were males. However, additional data have shown
that information search in mixed-sex groups is biased, too (e.g.,
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Fago, & Kici, 1999).
3. The same pattern of results is obtained by using the product
term of the confidence factor and the group task factor as a continu-
ous variable in a regression analysis, β = 2.28, t(40) = 2.18, p = .035.
Nevertheless, we use the median-split method in Experiments 1a and
1b to allow direct comparisons with Experiment 2, where group con-
fidence is introduced as an experimental factor.
4. Although in the earlier studies with individuals (Canon, 1964;
Freedman, 1965) no interaction effect of anticipated task require-
ments and confidence was observed, Canon (1964) found a stronger
confirmation bias in the information search of participants in the low-
confidence condition compared to participants in the high-confidence
condition (independent of anticipated task). However, this main effect
is difficult to interpret. On one hand, it is not clear whether confi-
dence was successfully manipulated in the Canon study, and on the
other hand, this main effect was not observed in the Freedman (1965)
study in which the same confidence manipulation yielded a significant
manipulation check. Therefore, we refrain from comparing the confi-
dence main effect of the Canon study with our group studies.
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